Fordham Law Review
Volume 86

Issue 5

Article 4

2018

The Hunt for Privacy Harms After Spokeo
Matthew S. DeLuca
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr

Recommended Citation
Matthew S. DeLuca, The Hunt for Privacy Harms After Spokeo, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 2439 (2018).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol86/iss5/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The Hunt for Privacy Harms After Spokeo
Erratum
Law; Torts; Privacy Law; Courts; Legal Remedies; Litigation; Internet Law; Supreme Court of the United
States

This note is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol86/iss5/4

NOTES
THE HUNT FOR PRIVACY HARMS
AFTER SPOKEO
Matthew S. DeLuca*
In recent years, due both to hacks that have leaked the personal
information of hundreds of millions of people and to concerns about
government surveillance, Americans have become more aware of the harms
that can accompany the widespread collection of personal data. However,
the law has not yet fully developed to recognize the concrete privacy harms
that can result from what otherwise seems like ordinary economic activity
involving the widespread aggregation and compilation of data.
This Note examines cases in which lower federal courts have applied the
Supreme Court’s directions for testing the concreteness of alleged intangible
privacy injuries, and in particular how that inquiry has affected plaintiffs’
suits under statutes that implicate privacy concerns. This Note proposes that,
in probing the concreteness of these alleged privacy harms, the courts,
through the doctrine of standing, are engaging in work that could serve to
revitalize the judiciary’s long-dormant analysis of the nature of privacy
harms. It suggests that courts should look beyond the four traditional privacy
torts to find standing for plaintiffs who bring claims against entities that
collect and misuse personal information. This Note urges courts to make use
of a nexus approach to identify overlapping privacy concerns sufficient for
standing, which would allow the federal judiciary to more adequately
address emerging privacy harms.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans say they want privacy but are often not quite sure how much
and seem unwilling to pay for it.1 Millions of people send messages, search
for information, and post photos using free online services, and frequently
give up some personal data in these exchanges.2
As a society that privileges the unhampered flow of information,3
Americans have long sensed a potential tension between values of free
1. Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Privacy and Information Sharing, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan.
14,
2016),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/privacy-and-information-sharing/
[https://perma.cc/R9M3-JRQB]; see also Adrienne LaFrance, The Convenience-Surveillance
Tradeoff, ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/
01/the-convenience-surveillance-tradeoff/423891/ [https://perma.cc/3PS2-9CTN].
2. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 1369, 1384–86 (2017); Mark Hachman, The Price of Free: How Apple, Facebook,
Microsoft and Google Sell You to Advertisers, PCWORLD (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 AM),
https://www.pcworld.com/article/2986988/privacy/the-price-of-free-how-apple-facebookmicrosoft-and-google-sell-you-to-advertisers.html [https://perma.cc/MQ4P-CYN3]; We Want
You to Understand What Data We Collect and Use, GOOGLE, https://privacy.google.com/yourdata.html [https://perma.cc/BQL8-6BKU] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
3. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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expression and the seemingly deep-rooted desire to have certain areas of life
remain off limits, not just to government but to prying private parties as well.4
And even as the internet becomes more solidly imbricated in the routines of
work and private life, there appears to be some feeling that perhaps people
are being asked to give up too much of their privacy in the process.5
This Note examines the way in which these American intuitions—and
ambivalences—are very much alive and topics of ongoing debates in the
federal courts.6 The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins,7 a 2016 case in which the Court expounded on the “concreteness” an
injury must have to merit access to the federal judiciary,8 demonstrates the
difficulties of this debate and has spurred a new phase in courts’
consideration of the nature of privacy harms. As might be expected, the
holdings of subsequent cases expose the varied strands, value judgments, and
doctrinal failures and successes of American privacy law.
Part I of this Note explores the nature of privacy law in America and the
doctrine of standing, along with its constitutional roots. It also outlines the
development of what has been referred to as the “data economy,”9 a robust
marketplace built on the collection and processing of massive amounts of
data by private enterprises. It begins by providing the background for these
two complicated and unresolved areas of law, standing and privacy, and casts
them against the rapid growth of commercial enterprises premised on the
collection and processing of information. This Part then demonstrates the
confrontation between a growing sense10 of potential harms and the Article
III constraints on what sorts of injuries allow access to federal courts. It notes
the judicial skepticism that operates as a restraining influence on the
development of American privacy law and outlines the Supreme Court’s
holding in Spokeo.
4. See Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 139–40; Neil M.
Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1160
(2005).
5. See Lee Rainie, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept.
21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/
[https://perma.cc/PY6J-WK7H].
6. Margot E. Kaminski, Standing After Snowden: Lessons on Privacy Harm from
National Security Surveillance Litigation, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 418–19 (2017); Bradford
C. Mank, Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the Supreme Court
Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1362–63 (2017).
7. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
8. Id. at 1548–49.
9. Adam B. Thimmesch, Transacting in Data: Tax, Privacy, and the New Economy, 94
DENV. L. REV. 145, 147–48 (2016).
10. Fifty-five percent of respondents to one survey said they decided not to make a
purchase online because they were concerned about privacy. Companies That Fail to See
Privacy as a Business Priority Risk Crossing the ‘Creepy Line,’ KPMG (Nov. 6, 2016),
https://home.kpmg.com/sg/en/home/media/press-releases/2016/11/companies-that-fail-tosee-privacy-as-a-business-priority-risk-crossing-the-creepy-line.html
[https://perma.cc/X2CS-SQJN]; see also Lee Rainie & Shiva Maniam, Americans Feel the
Tensions Between Privacy and Security Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/19/americans-feel-the-tensions-betweenprivacy-and-security-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/9BGR-DPUH] (describing “findings
suggesting that Americans are becoming more anxious about their privacy”).
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Part II notes the various ways that lower courts have applied Spokeo to
reach standing conclusions when plaintiffs bring claims under statutes that
implicate a privacy interest. It addresses the manner in which courts have
analyzed statutory privacy interests in relation to common law causes of
action when they inspect whether plaintiffs’ alleged privacy injuries are
sufficiently concrete. This Part also explores the problems that may arise
when encouraging courts to explore what this Note refers to as “common law
analogues”11 in the context of privacy claims.
The final section, Part III, suggests that the instruction the Supreme Court
gave in Spokeo to lower courts—to look to “whether an alleged intangible
harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts”12—may
provide an opportunity for a reinvigorated judicial approach to privacy
harms. This Part—evoking the historical context of American privacy law,
which has often developed in response to changing technology13—proposes
that Spokeo could in fact initiate renewed judicial consideration of the nature
of privacy harms, bringing vitality to a long-stagnant area of American
jurisprudence. It considers compelling theories of privacy harm advanced by
scholars and encourages courts to go beyond the four privacy torts famously
laid out by William Prosser.14 It suggests that Spokeo leaves room for courts
to look beyond these four torts to other long-recognized harms by examining
the place for a nexus approach to identify privacy harms, an approach that
can already be observed at work in recent district and circuit court opinions.
I. PRIVACY AND STANDING:
BRANDEISIAN BRAIN CHILDREN COLLIDE
In recent years, and certainly since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Spokeo, privacy concerns and the doctrine of standing—the set of initial
requirements that plaintiffs must establish to get out of the gate in federal
court15—appear to have come into conflict.16 Part I.A outlines the rudiments
of standing, including injury in fact. Part I.B sketches the development of
American privacy law over the past nearly 130 years and the more recent
rapid growth of an economic model for internet businesses based primarily
on easily collected data.17 Part I.C probes the extent to which American
11. This phrase for framing the inquiry is borrowed from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2017).
While the phrase is useful, however, it is also somewhat misleading: Spokeo’s instruction that
courts may look to traditional bases for lawsuits in assessing concreteness does not restrict
them to forms of injury recognized at common law. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
12. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
13. Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial
Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 331, 351 (2012).
14. See infra Part I.B.1.
15. Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 465 (2008).
16. Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 439
(2017).
17. See Thomas C. Redman, 4 Business Models for the Data Age, HARV. BUS. REV. (May
20, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/4-business-models-for-the-data-age [https://perma.cc/
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judges sometimes exhibit skepticism toward privacy claims. Part I.D then
discusses Spokeo in detail and draws out the key portions of the opinion as
they pertain to plaintiffs who seek to bring statutory privacy claims in federal
court.
A. What Is Standing?
In its simplest formulation, standing doctrine demands that plaintiffs who
seek to avail themselves of the power of a federal court must, at a minimum,
satisfy three requirements before the court will consider the merits of their
claims18: (1) they must have suffered an injury in fact that is “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent,” (2) the injury must be traceable to
the allegedly unlawful conduct of the defendant, and (3) the injury must have
the potential to be effectively redressed by a favorable outcome in the court.19
These three elements constitute an “irreducible constitutional minimum,” a
“core component of standing.”20 Challenges to standing can be brought at
any time in the course of a suit in federal court because they implicate the
court’s jurisdiction over the claims.21 This Note will only consider the first
of standing’s requirements, injury in fact, which was at issue in Spokeo and
which, for now, poses a significant hurdle for privacy plaintiffs.22
Part I.A.1 below discusses the development of the doctrine of standing.
Part I.A.2 particularly examines the requirement of injury in fact.
1. Development of the Doctrine
In explaining its rationale for demanding standing for all cases brought in
the federal courts, the Court has said that the three elements of standing are
required by the Constitution.23 The Court has stated that the requirements of
standing emanate from Article III’s limitation of the federal courts’
jurisdiction to “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.”24 The doctrine is justified as
6LUG-SGKU]; Douglas Rushkoff, When the Data Bubble Bursts, Companies Will Have to
Actually
Sell
Things
Again,
FAST
COMPANY
(May
13,
2016),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3059722/when-the-data-bubble-bursts-companies-will-haveto-actually-sell-things-again [https://perma.cc/C9AP-8BB7].
18. Gregory R. Manring, Note, It’s Time for an Intervention!: Resolving the Conflict
Between Rule 24(a)(2) and Article III Standing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2525, 2535–37 (2017).
19. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see also William A. Fletcher,
The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988) (“The essence of a true standing
question is the following: Does the plaintiff have a legal right to judicial enforcement of an
asserted legal duty?”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A NeoFederalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 395 (1996).
20. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
22. See Eric S. Boos et al., Damages Theories in Data Breach Litigation, 16 SEDONA
CONF. J. 125, 126 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation as Bellwether for
Institutional Change, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 539 (2017); Lexi Rubow, Standing in the Way
of Privacy Protections: The Argument for a Relaxed Article III Standing Requirement for
Constitutional and Statutory Causes of Action, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1007, 1011–12
(2014).
23. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547
(2016).
24. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–61.
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a necessary safeguard to ensure that cases are brought in a genuinely
adversarial setting that draws in the proper disputing parties, as a check
against generalized grievances and advisory opinions, and as a means to
ensure that the federal judiciary does not overstep its proper role or impinge
on the powers of the elected branches.25
While the Court has sometimes spoken in conclusive tones about the
elements of standing, at other times it has seemed much more uncertain about
whether the outlines of standing can be definitively articulated.26 While
scholars dispute the extent to which standing has always, under other names,
been an aspect of Article III jurisdiction,27 it seems clear that standing as the
Court understands it today developed in the early twentieth century and is at
least partly attributable to the judicial innovations of Justice Louis
Brandeis.28 While standing doctrine may frequently be viewed today as a
judicially imposed barrier for plaintiffs,29 it began its modern history as a
check on judges, a mechanism to make it harder for the Court to strike down
democratically enacted statutes amid the growth of the regulatory state.30
It was Justice Brandeis who, in 1922, wrote for the Court in Fairchild v.
Hughes,31 a case in which a plaintiff sought to have the Nineteenth
Amendment declared unconstitutional.32 The Court found that the plaintiff’s
claims did not “afford a basis for [the] proceeding.”33 What is now
recognized as the first of the three elements of standing, injury in fact, does
not appear explicitly in Fairchild. A case decided one year later,

25. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 222.
26. Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (stating that “the core component of standing is an
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement”), with Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) (declaring that “[g]eneralizations
about standing to sue are largely worthless as such”), and Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (observing that “[w]e
need not mince words” in saying that the Court has not defined Article III standing “with
complete consistency”).
27. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061,
1064–65 (2015); Fletcher, supra note 19, at 224–26; F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-ofPowers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV. 673, 679–80 (2017); Laveta Casdorph, Comment,
The Constitution and the Reconstitution of the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 471,
479–81 (1999).
28. “[T]he modern doctrine of standing is a distinctly twentieth century product that was
fashioned out of other doctrinal materials largely through the conscious efforts of Justices
Brandeis and Frankfurter.” Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1988); see also F. Andrew Hessick, Standing,
Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 291 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1437 (1988).
29. Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs
Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 563–86 (2012).
30. Id. at 557; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741,
1767 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,”
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179–80 (1992).
31. 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
32. Id. at 127.
33. Id. at 129.
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Frothingham v. Mellon,34 is generally pointed to as the first modern standing
case.35
The Court in Frothingham faced, in part, a taxpayer challenge to the
Maternity Act, which directed funds to the states with the purpose of
improving health care and reducing mortality rates for mothers and
newborns.36 The civilian plaintiff alleged that the additional taxes to support
the Act would “increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take her
property without due process of law.”37 Stating that the Court had never
before directly decided this issue, and that the question had theretofore passed
“sub silentio” or that the determination of it had been “expressly withheld,”38
the Court held that taxpayer status alone was not sufficient to present a
justiciable issue.39 Grounding its reasoning on a separation-of-powers
rationale, the Court said that it may “review and annul acts of Congress” as
violations of the Constitution only when a plaintiff alleged “some direct
injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue.”40
2. Injury in Fact
The first Supreme Court case to explicitly demand injury in fact as a
requirement for standing was Ass’n of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp.41 The petitioners in that case were in the business
of selling data-processing services.42 The Court declared that the primary
question in determining whether a plaintiff has established standing is
whether the plaintiff alleges an “injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”43
This injury-in-fact requirement has remained a basic element of the Article
III standing analysis ever since it developed within the administrative law
context presented in Data Processing.44
Since injury in fact’s full-fledged arrival in Data Processing, judges have
had to determine what sorts of injury should even be visible to the
discriminating eye of the judiciary.45 Scholars have argued that Justice
Antonin Scalia’s formulation of injury in fact as laid out for the Court in

34. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
35. Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and the
Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 377, 427–28 (2009); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing
Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303, 309 n.35
(1996).
36. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479.
37. Id. at 486.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 488.
40. Id.
41. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see id. at 152; Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized
Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221, 237 n.79 (2008); Fletcher, supra note 19, at 230.
42. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151.
43. Id. at 152.
44. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 230.
45. Courtney M. Cox, Risky Standing: Deciding on Injury, 8 NE. U. L.J. 75, 94–95 (2016).
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife46 tightened the requirements47 by providing
that a congressional grant of standing, in this case in the Endangered Species
Act, was inadequate for Article III purposes.48
B. The Evolving Nature of Privacy Harms
Theoretical justifications for privacy law have ranged from “the right to be
let alone” to a right to control information about one’s self.49 The task of
defining the harm has an important role in privacy law.50 Part I.B.1 discusses
the development of privacy law in America, and Part I.B.2 explores the
growth of an economic model dependent on the acquisition of data. Part I.B.3
introduces the challenges that face privacy plaintiffs attempting to secure
standing in federal court.
1. The Path of American Privacy Law
The very idea of privacy law has a decidedly “uneven history” in
America.51 While the common law privacy torts form an important part of
the story of American privacy law,52 the federal court system, and in
particular the Supreme Court and its Justices, has been intimately involved
in concerns about privacy, and technological encroachments upon it, for more
than a century.53 It was future Supreme Court Justice Brandeis who, along
with Samuel Warren, penned the 1890 Harvard Law Review article54 that
46. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
47. Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in the
Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 750 (2016); Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes,
Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split Regarding Standing in Procedural
Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 175, 185 (2006). In a law
review article published before he became a Supreme Court Justice, Antonin Scalia argued
that standing doctrine is a “crucial and inseparable element” of the principle of separation of
powers. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983). Scalia wrote that standing achieves this
by enforcing a boundary “restricting the courts to their assigned role of protecting minority
rather than majority interests.” Id. at 895. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who wrote in Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), that “the law of Art[icle] III standing is built on a single basic
idea—the idea of separation of powers,” id. at 752, joined Justice Harry Blackmun’s Lujan
dissent, which criticized Justice Scalia’s majority opinion for its “anachronistically formal
view of the separation of powers,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1172–73 (1993).
49. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–111 (2002).
50. Fred H. Cate, Principles of Internet Privacy, 32 CONN. L. REV. 877, 889 (2000).
51. Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 432 (2017).
52. Don Corbett, Virtual Espionage: Spyware and the Common Law Privacy Torts, 36
U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2006).
53. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (asking “what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy”); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler
of human privacy ever known.”); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren,
C.J., concurring) (“[T]he fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute
a great danger to the privacy of the individual.”).
54. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890) (citing “[r]ecent inventions and business methods” as motivating a need for legal
recognition of privacy concerns).
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“[o]ut of a few scraps of precedent . . . invented a brand-new tort, invasion of
privacy.”55 Brandeis would weave his developing vision of privacy into his
opinions once on the Court.56 For example, in his famous dissent in
Olmstead v. United States,57 a prohibition-era wire-tapping case, Brandeis
forewarned of the invasions of privacy that could come with “[a]dvances in
the psychic and related sciences [that] may bring means of exploring
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.”58
Seventy years after Warren and Brandeis published their article, famed
torts scholar William Prosser set out to map the spread of the right they
identified and reviewed more than three hundred cases that had arisen in the
intervening decades.59 Prosser announced that the law of privacy was made
up of four interests that could be invaded in four distinct ways: (1) intrusion
upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) false light, and (4)
appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness.60
The law has never quite gone so far as to fully enforce what Warren and
Brandeis referred to as “the right ‘to be let alone.’”61 Privacy law such as it
exists in the United States today consists of a mix of federal and state statutes,
along with common law torts.62 Privacy statutes tend to be scattered and of
limited scope.63 The small handful of federal statutes targets a range of
specific privacy concerns and includes the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
(FCRA),64 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),65
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA),66 and the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).67 Many states have either
codified the privacy torts in statute or recognize them under common law.68
The law has long identified a tension between the desire to enforce a zone
of personal privacy and other core principles of American law, including the
First Amendment.69 Privacy has nestled most comfortably into the law where
55. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 548 (1973); see also Ken
Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (describing Justices
Warren and Brandeis’s handiwork as “light on hard precedent, but full of optimism”).
56. Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV.
1295, 1331 (2010).
57. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
58. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
59. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 388–89 (1960).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–E (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Prosser, supra
note 59, at 389.
61. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 54, at 195.
62. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2006).
63. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877,
881 (2003) (stating that statutes “address specific elements of fair information practices”).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
65. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
68. Matthew C. Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law: A Framework
for the Right of Privacy on the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83, 105 (2002).
69. See John A. Humbach, Privacy and the Right of Free Expression, 11 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 16, 26–28 (2012); Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A
Skeptical Approach, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 132–33 (2000).
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it protects individual interests against government power,70 and so the Court
has spoken out more forcefully for individual privacy in the context of Fourth
Amendment rights.71 There, the assertion of privacy rights has sat more
agreeably alongside interests that Anglo-American law has thoroughly
metabolized, such as the sanctity of the home72 and the right to be free from
“unreasonable governmental prying.”73 The Court has observed that “a
person’s general right to privacy . . . is, like the protection of his property and
of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.”74
The reluctance of the law to fully embrace privacy has been given
expression by some scholars and jurists who argue that the costs of privacy
are too high.75 Privacy is seen, in many instances in which it is asserted, as
little more than a desire that others not obtain information that one would
rather others not possess.76 Critics of asserted privacy rights contend that
keeping privacy protections out of the law, or keeping such protections very
narrowly tailored, has social benefits, including protecting broad freedom of
expression77 and allowing increased economic uses of information.78 Indeed,
one scholar has argued that the relative absence of American privacy laws
may have been an important condition for the development of the commercial
internet.79 A counterpoint is provided by both the experience of European
nations (which tend to have both an active internet and stricter privacy
regulation) and independent research that indicates that the lack of privacy
protections may make individuals reluctant to use the internet.80
70. “To Americans, the starting point for the understanding of the right to privacy is of
course to be sought in the late eighteenth century, and especially in the Bill of Rights . . . .”
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE
L.J. 1151, 1211–12 (2004). “In particular, ‘privacy’ begins with the Fourth Amendment: At
its origin, the right to privacy is the right against unlawful searches and seizures.” Id. at 1212.
71. See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 115–16 (2008).
72. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
73. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 166 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967).
75. See BENJAMIN WITTES & JODIE C. LIU, THE PRIVACY PARADOX: THE PRIVACY
BENEFITS OF PRIVACY THREATS 8 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/Wittes-and-Liu_Privacy-paradox_v10.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERK9-XT2Y]; Richard
A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978); Kent Walker, The Costs of
Privacy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 88 (2001) (“[L]aws regulating privacy chill the
creation of beneficial collective goods and erode social values.”).
76. Grant Gross, Judge: Give NSA Unlimited Access to Digital Data, PCWORLD (Dec. 4,
2014, 1:46 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2855776/judge-give-nsa-unlimited-accessto-digital-data.html [https://perma.cc/ZV5S-GSJB] (quoting Judge Posner as stating that
“[m]uch of what passes for the name of privacy is really just trying to conceal the disreputable
parts of your conduct”).
77. See Fred H. Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues in Information Privacy, 9
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 51 (2002); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking
About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2000).
78. Walker, supra note 75, at 88.
79. See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 667 (2014)
(describing “[t]he absence of privacy constraints” as “especially conducive to [i]nternet
innovation”).
80. See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite
Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 434–35 (2014); Will Yakowicz, Two-Thirds
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2. The Growth of the Data Economy
Information, even of imperfect quality, has long been valuable, even if it
has not always been understood as a commodity.81 The expansion of creditreporting agencies in the late nineteenth century struck some contemporary
observers as an extremely worrisome form of public snooping.82 The
development of the commercial internet made the collection and aggregation
of information on a mass scale simpler and more lucrative. Today, personal
data is gathered, mined, and marketed by companies large and small on a
regular basis.83 Household-name companies like Google and Facebook, as
well as smaller enterprises,84 hold vast troves of data, which power an
economy premised on the collection of personal information.85 With those
stores of data comes a risk of disclosure, whether as the result of a hack or
other form of breach,86 as well as the possibility that a company or other
entity may make use of the collected data in an unlawful manner.

of Customers Are Worried About Security While Shopping Online, INC. (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/survey-66-percent-customers-worried-id-theftshopping-online.html [https://perma.cc/VS3U-XZ3W].
81. See, e.g., HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 86 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1996)
(noting “rumor that carries news to men like nothing else”).
82. See, e.g., Sarah Jeong, Credit Bureaus Were the NSA of the 19th Century, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/mass-surveillancewas-invented-by-credit-bureaus/479226/ [https://perma.cc/MN4X-G2V5].
83. See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, Google Now Knows When Its Users Go to
the Store and Buy Stuff, WASH. POST (May 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2017/05/23/google-now-knows-when-you-are-at-a-cash-register-and-howmuch-you-are-spending/ [https://perma.cc/AN5Z-SRZF].
84. Michel Falcon, You Can Collect Customer Data and Deliver a Better Experience
Without Violating Privacy, ENTREPRENEUR (July 31, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/296270 [https://perma.cc/9S3K-AAWY]; Mike Montgomery, Small Businesses
Shouldn’t Fear Big Data, FORBES (May 7, 2015, 1:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
mikemontgomery/2015/05/07/small-businesses-shouldnt-fear-big-data/
[https://perma.cc/
K5XB-4NBF]; Phil Simon, Even Small Companies Can Tap Big Data If They Know Where to
Look, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 16, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/12/even-small-companies-cantap-big-data-if-they-know-where-to-look [https://perma.cc/5YYB-FRS3].
85. See Anita L. Allen, Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big Data Economy, 130 HARV.
L. REV. F. 71, 71 (2016); Cate, supra note 50, at 888–89; Franks, supra note 51, at 454 (“Cell
phone carriers, social media applications, and search engines now possess huge troves of user
information.”); Sheri B. Pan, Note, Get to Know Me: Protecting Privacy and Autonomy Under
Big Data’s Penetrating Gaze, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 239, 245 (2016) (“As more collection
becomes constant, it is also increasingly imperceptible.”); see also In re Nickelodeon
Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2016) (describing the “data-collecting
infrastructure” of the internet that “hums along quietly in the background”); In re Google, Inc.
Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013)
(noting that Google’s free products “turn a healthy profit . . . rely[ing] in substantial part on
users’ personal identification information”); Paul Boutin, The Secretive World of Selling Data
About You, NEWSWEEK (May 30, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/secretiveworld-selling-data-about-you-464789 [https://perma.cc/F3A2-2ZCX].
86. See Selena Larson, The Hacks That Left Us Exposed in 2017, CNN (Dec. 20, 2017,
9:11 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/18/technology/biggest-cyberattacks-of-the-year/
index.html [https://perma.cc/KK8P-GGGS].
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Whether individuals use smartphone applications,87 go out to eat at
popular restaurants,88 or wear certain activity-tracking devices,89 private
persons, if they want to avail themselves of the promises of new technologies,
often have little choice90 but to hand over a variety of detailed information,
such as their social security numbers and dates of birth, as well as potentially
more intimate details—including their location91 or searches they conduct
over the internet92—to companies that may profit off that information.
With the growth of the commercial internet, companies realized a potential
to gather more information for profitable use.93 DoubleClick, for example,
emerged in the late 1990s and became the internet’s dominant advertising
service by offering targeted ads based on profiles the company built of
internet users.94 Today, individuals effectively pay for some of the world’s
most popular online services by handing over information about
themselves.95 The collection of data has gone beyond the accumulation of
87. Kaveh Waddell, When Apps Secretly Team Up to Steal Your Data, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/04/when-apps-collude-to-stealyour-data/522177/ [https://perma.cc/7QN8-ZCQD].
88. Karen Stabiner, To Survive in Tough Times, Restaurants Turn to Data Mining, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/dining/restaurant-softwareanalytics-data-mining.html [https://perma.cc/PPL7-8XDH].
89. Jenna McLaughlin, How the Spies Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Fitbit, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Feb. 1, 2018, 12:38 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/01/how-the-spies-learnedto-stop-worrying-and-love-fitbit/ [https://perma.cc/8W6Q-4GSG].
90. The lack of meaningful choice to participate in an economic system that relies in large
part on the disclosure of personal information was observed by one Supreme Court Justice
four decades ago. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not
entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary
society without maintaining a bank account.”).
91. Gil Aegerter, License Plate Data Not Just for Cops: Private Companies Are Tracking
Your Car, NBC NEWS (July 19, 2013, 4:44 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/
license-plate-data-not-just-cops-private-companies-are-tracking-f6C10684677
[https://perma.cc/XK88-AL7C]; Jessica Leber, How Wireless Carriers Are Monetizing Your
Movements, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/513016/
how-wireless-carriers-are-monetizing-your-movements/ [https://perma.cc/Y5NG-RZ4Y].
92. Dan Gillmor, As We Sweat Government Surveillance, Companies Like Google Collect
Our Data, GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2014, 12:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/apr/18/corporations-google-should-not-sell-customer-data
[https://perma.cc/ZDW4-AJ32]; Bruce Schneier, ‘Stalker Economy’ Here to Stay, CNN (NOV.
26, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/20/opinion/schneier-stalker-economy/index.html
[https://perma.cc/S4NB-BMBB].
93. “Personalization is the new religion of the information society, and the quant jocks of
Big Data are its high priests.” Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904,
1923 (2013); see also Getting to Know You, ECONOMIST (Sept. 11, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21615871-everything-people-do-onlineavidly-followed-advertisers-and-third-party [https://perma.cc/9R42-5XM5].
94. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
95. The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST (May
6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-newapproach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource [https://perma.cc/E4QT-728W]; see
also Franks, supra note 51, at 454 (“Google and Facebook are not in fact free services, but
rather platforms that essentially trade in users’ private information.”); Catherine Tremble,
Note, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social Networks’ Use of MachineLearning Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 839 (2017).
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details like names, addresses, and social security numbers; companies can
pan through a flood of videos, photos, social media postings, location
information, and other sources of data generated through the use of
technology.96 This constant flow of information, and the insights and
revenues it can generate for businesses, has led to data being described as the
“oil” of the modern economy.97
Recognizing this potential, businesses have for years identified their data
stores as among their most prized assets.98
3. A “Kilimanjaro” for Privacy Plaintiffs?
While the expansion of this fecund data economy has met little legal or
political resistance,99 plaintiffs who have brought claims under a statute
alleging privacy-right violations in federal court have sometimes faced an
uphill battle.100
Standing doctrine has long been most comfortable with “tangible” injuries:
the economic, physical, or other harms that the legal community of lawyers
and judges can label and assess.101 But the necessity of a “concrete, living
96. Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21721634-how-it-shaping-up-data-giving-risenew-economy [https://perma.cc/JE9L-27AK].
97. Id.; see also Ben Tarnoff, Silicon Valley Siphons Our Data Like Oil. But the Deepest
Drilling
Has
Just
Begun,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
23,
2017,
4:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/23/silicon-valley-big-data-extraction-amazonwhole-foods-facebook [https://perma.cc/A6W4-JFYA]; Ajay S. Banga, A Global Economy
Powered by Data, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2016/01/a-global-economy-powered-by-data [https://perma.cc/RP23-5MZ7] (“Just as
steam powered much of the First Industrial Revolution, the free flow of data will be
fundamental to powering what the World Economic Forum and others are calling the Fourth
Industrial Revolution.”).
98. Douglas Laney, Infonomics: The Practice of Information Economics, FORBES (May
22, 2012, 11:44 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2012/05/22/infonomicsthe-practice-of-information-economics/#1d3608626ee4 [https://perma.cc/GY72-8NKY]; see
also Alan Lewis & Dan McKone, To Get More Value from Your Data, Sell It, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Oct. 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/to-get-more-value-from-your-data-sell-it
[https://perma.cc/GJ7H-M43F] (“Many companies guard their data as their crown jewels.”);
The Rise of Data Capital, MIT TECH. REV. 4 (Mar. 21, 2016), http://files.technology
review.com/whitepapers/MIT_Oracle+Report-The_Rise_of_Data_Capital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BG6M-J8R5] (“Data capital is one of the most important assets of every
online consumer service created in the past decade.”). By contrast, technologist and security
expert Bruce Schneier has argued in light of major data breaches that “data is a toxic asset and
saving it is dangerous.” Bruce Schneier, Data Is a Toxic Asset, so Why Not Throw It Out?,
CNN (Mar. 1, 2016, 7:12 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/01/opinions/data-is-a-toxicasset-opinion-schneier/index.html [https://perma.cc/5R6Q-5NL8].
99. See Farhad Manjoo, Can Washington Stop Big Tech Companies?: Don’t Bet on It,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/technology/regulatingtech-companies.html [https://perma.cc/DT6Y-SAZV].
100. Wu, supra note 16, at 439; see also In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (“[E]ven though injury-infact may not generally be Mount Everest . . . in data privacy cases in the Northern District of
California, the doctrine might still reasonably be described as Kilimanjaro.”).
101. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Although tangible injuries
are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that
intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460
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contest between adversaries”102 has not prevented standing doctrine from
recognizing intangible harms as valid for Article III purposes.
While the intangibility of alleged privacy harms may often count against
them, some commentators have noted, by way of comparison, the way
intangible harms—implicated in torts such as loss of consortium or breach of
confidence—are routinely recognized by the courts.103 One prominent past
recognition of standing for an intangible injury was in FEC v. Akins,104 in
which the Court said that the denial of information to which the plaintiffs
were entitled under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) constituted
injury in fact.105 And the Court in Spokeo cited free speech and free exercise
cases to support its reaffirmation of the principle that intangible injuries can
be sufficiently concrete.106
At the same time, the bar for privacy harms appears to be elevated.107 One
scholar has perceived a shift away from asking “whether the plaintiff before
the court [is] the right plaintiff” to asking whether “the harm caused by the
defendant is the right kind of harm.”108 The move toward questioning the
cognizability of some alleged privacy harms was occurring in the lower
courts before Spokeo.109
C. Judicial Skepticism of Privacy Harms
Courts before Spokeo were already weighing the many ways in which
plaintiffs allege data-related privacy harms.110 For example, there currently
exists a circuit split that developed before Spokeo on whether a plaintiff can
allege as a cognizable injury in fact the increased future risk of identity theft
after a data breach.111 In reviewing the development of privacy as a legal
concern in the United States, commentators have noted the way in which the
(1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (describing the “expert feel of lawyers” in assessing what
constitutes a case or a controversy); see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551
U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing “Wallet Injury” as opposed to
“Psychic Injury”).
102. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460.
103. “[I]n other areas of the law, conceptions of harm have evolved to recognize injury that
is hard to see or measure. This is true for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and other
matters that are not easily translated into monetary terms.” Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats
Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 756 (2018);
see also Wu, supra note 16, at 439.
104. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
105. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 638 (1999).
106. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460
(2009); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
107. Kaminski, supra note 6, at 416.
108. Wu, supra note 16, at 439.
109. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011); Wu, supra note 16, at 447.
110. Solove & Citron, supra note 103, at 744 (observing that for some judges “recognizing
data-breach harms is akin to attempting to tap dance on quicksand, with the safest approach
being to retreat to the safety of the most traditional notions of harm”).
111. Compare Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that the
plaintiffs had not established standing), with Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d
688, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that standing had been properly established regarding
future risk of identity theft).
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accretive processes that have contributed to privacy law have often been
catalyzed by radical upsets in technology and society.112
At the same time, while noting this hesitancy in the legal community, it is
wrong to suggest that American judges, or the citizenry for that matter, are
indifferent to privacy concerns.113 It may be that the judiciary’s reluctance
to jump to recognizing privacy harms is, at least in part, bound up in the way
in which privacy wended its way into American law in the first place.
The word “privacy” appears nowhere in the Constitution.114 Causes of
action against, for example, eavesdropping (alongside extrajudicial selfremedies, such as dueling) provided some protection in preconstitutional
America for what may be understood today as privacy interests. The famous
1763 case Wilkes v. Wood115 captured the colonial imagination as a
paradigmatic instance of unlawful government intrusion.116 Since then, one
scholar has summed up some of the privacy interests embedded in the
Constitution as including, among others, protections for personal religious
practices, private property, and some economic activity.117 The Court has
recognized that the Constitution provides protections for personal privacy
against intrusion by the government.118
The privacy torts as they are recognized today are another matter. Neil
Richards and Daniel Solove have pointed to the pivotal role that Prosser
played in systematizing and raising the status of the privacy torts as a prime
factor in privacy law’s relative nonresponsiveness to social change over the
decades since Prosser’s article.119 While Prosser’s review of hundreds of
cases implicating privacy, which led to his sorting them into four cognizable
privacy torts, played a hugely influential role in gaining legitimacy for
privacy as a distinct legal interest,120 it also may have sapped the “generative
and creative energy sparked by the Warren and Brandeis article,” leaving
privacy to calcify in the face of the technological changes of recent
112. “The key to understanding legal privacy as it has developed over 100 years of
American life . . . is to understand that its meaning is heavily driven by the events of history.”
Gormley, supra note 55, at 1340. “The most distinctive characteristic of privacy—which can
be gleaned from a hundred-year examination of the cases—is its heavy sensitivity to historical
triggers.” Id. at 1439; see also Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of
Privacy in the United States and Its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 83, 89 (2008); Julia M. MacAllister, Note, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking a Remedy
for the Malicious Publication of Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2462
(2017).
113. See Whitman, supra note 70, at 1158 (“It is simply false to say that privacy doesn’t
matter to Americans.”).
114. Reidenberg, supra note 63, at 879.
115. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (CP).
116. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 772
(1994); Sprague, supra note 112, at 94.
117. Sprague, supra note 112, at 102.
118. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
119. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889 (2010). Prosser may have been keen on bolstering what he saw as
more promising fledgling torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
Richards and Solove observe that Prosser seems to have been concerned that these might be
“swallowed up by privacy.” Id. at 1908–09.
120. Id. at 1888.
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decades.121 But Prosser alone cannot bear the blame for the judiciary’s
skeptical approach to privacy concerns.122 His privacy torts have cast their
long shadow because courts, Richards and Solove argue, enthusiastically
embraced Prosser’s categories and “stopped engaging in the dynamic
creative activity” that had accompanied earlier judicial exploration of alleged
privacy harms.123
But judges have also found ways to view privacy harms that are more in
keeping with traditional notions of what an injury should look like. So, for
example, some courts have felt comfortable reaching for a decrease in a
smartphone’s battery charge as an adequate injury when a plaintiff alleged
that a party’s data-collection activities caused their phone battery to drain
more rapidly.124
Some privacy concerns have also long been seen as conflicting with First
Amendment values.125 If enthusiasts say data are the oil of the information
economy, then the free exchange of facts and opinions is the oil of a vibrant
democratic republic.126
Richards argues that, even for Brandeis, the organization of the tort law of
privacy seems to have been a secondary concern over the course of
Brandeis’s wide-ranging career—less important than what the Justice saw as
the socially salubrious “duty of publicity.”127 Richards suggests that, as his
thought matured, Brandeis himself grew to favor a conception of privacy
founded on the Constitution and not on tort—a form of “intellectual
privacy.”128 This conceptualization supported, rather than undermined, First
Amendment values by “protect[ing] individuals’ emotional and intellectual
processes so that they can think for themselves.”129
D. Spokeo and Its Holding
Part I.D.1 outlines the key portions of the Supreme Court’s Spokeo
decision. Part I.D.2 provides background on what the parties to the case and
amici curiae saw at stake in Spokeo. Last, Part I.D.3 asks what, if any, change
Spokeo brought about in federal standing doctrine.

121. Id. at 1890–91.
122. Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27
NOVA L. REV. 289, 289–90 (2002); Robert M. Connallon, Comment, An Integrative
Alternative for America’s Privacy Torts, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 71, 82–83 (2007).
123. Richards & Solove, supra note 119, at 1917.
124. In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013 WL
1283236, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); Goodman v. HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP,
2012 WL 2412070, at *5 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2012).
125. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
126. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
127. Richards, supra note 56, at 1310–11.
128. Id. at 1343.
129. Id. at 1342.
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1. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court decided Spokeo in May 2016.130 The muchanticipated131 case arose from claims brought by the plaintiff, Robins, under
the FCRA.132 Spokeo runs a website that can be used to generate reports on
individuals by gathering information including age, address, and data on
more personal matters, including income.133 Robins alleged that Spokeo
maintained a report on him that contained numerous inaccuracies and that
Spokeo thereby was in violation of FCRA.134
Robins brought claims under the FCRA provisions that provide that
consumer reporting agencies “follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy” of consumer reports135 and that
[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the
Act] with respect to any [individual] is liable to that [individual] for, among
other things, either “actual damages” or statutory damages of $100 to
$1,000 per violation, costs of the action and attorney’s fees, and possibly
punitive damages.136

The Supreme Court did not directly address the question “[w]hether
Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no
concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction
of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare
violation of a federal statute.”137 The Court instead held that the Ninth
Circuit erred by finding standing based on Robins’s alleged particularized
injury and by failing to consider whether the injury was also concrete.138
2. Disagreement over What Was at Stake in Spokeo
Amicus briefs filed in Spokeo by privacy groups and members of private
industry took different views on the nature of the data-driven activity at issue
in the case. Privacy advocates, as well as the U.S. Solicitor General,139
argued that the FCRA’s private right of action played an important role in
regulating the uses companies make of the data that they collect.140
Industry voices, on the other hand, foresaw a rush of “no-injury class
action lawsuits” that “could threaten nearly every aspect of the U.S.
130. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016).
131. Editorial, Justices Should Let an Online Privacy Case Proceed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/opinion/sunday/justices-should-let-a-onlineprivacy-case-proceed.html [https://perma.cc/85TS-6C8P].
132. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544.
133. Id. at 1546.
134. Id.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012).
136. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)).
137. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339).
138. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
139. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27, Spokeo,
136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339) (“That interest is particularly salient given the modern
proliferation of large databases and the ease and rapidity of Internet transmissions.”).
140. Brief for Amici Curiae Center for Democracy & Technology et al. in Support of
Respondent at 15, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339).
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economy.”141 Google, Yahoo!, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Netflix were among
the technology companies that signed on to a brief in which they argued that
their businesses were “uniquely vulnerable to the untoward consequences of
the Ninth Circuit’s misreading of Article III.”142 The amici noted that their
“successful innovations and use of easily replicated computer processes
allow billions of people to benefit from the valuable services and products
they provide, usually at little or no cost to consumers.”143 In another brief,
amici media companies argued that a strict injury-in-fact line would help
ward off abusive class action suits.144
3. Did Spokeo Change Anything?
One legal observer described the Court’s narrow holding in Spokeo as
“somewhat of a disappointment.”145 At least some courts have not been
convinced that Spokeo represents a substantial shift in the Supreme Court’s
standing jurisprudence.146 One circuit assessed Spokeo’s influence as casting
a renewed focus for courts on examining subject matter jurisdiction when it
appears that a plaintiff may be alleging merely a bare procedural violation of
a statute.147 One district court has described Spokeo as laying out a
“blueprint” for assessing the concreteness of an alleged injury but said that
the Supreme Court’s opinion merely had recited standard conceptions of the
injury-in-fact requirement.148 Another district court summed up Spokeo as
“offer[ing] useful guidance.”149 These differing conceptions about precisely
what Spokeo means, and whether or not it develops pre-existing law, appear
to be Spokeo’s most significant short-term legacies.150

141. Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer Data Industry Association in Support of Petitioner
at 3–4, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339).
142. Brief for Amici Curiae eBay Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioner at 5, Spokeo, 136 S.
Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339).
143. Id. at 6.
144. Brief for Amici Curiae Time Inc. and Seven Media Organizations in Support of
Petitioner at 24, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339).
145. Amy Howe, Opinion, Case on Standing and Concrete Harm Returns to the Ninth
Circuit, at Least for Now, SCOTUSBLOG (May 16, 2016, 6:45 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/opinion-analysis-case-on-standing-and-concrete-harmreturns-to-the-ninth-circuit-at-least-for-now/ [https://perma.cc/3KLJ-6Y34].
146. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 637–38 (3d
Cir. 2017) (“[W]e do not believe that the Court so intended to change the traditional standard
for the establishment of standing.”); Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, 193 F. Supp. 3d 623, 629
(E.D. Va. 2016) (“Spokeo did not change the basic requirements of standing.”); see also
Michael G. McLellan, Finding a Leg to Stand on: Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and Statutory
Standing in Consumer Litigation, 31 ANTITRUST 49, 49–50 (2017).
147. Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2017).
148. Aranda v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 850, 855 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
149. Ruk v. Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:16-CV-3444-LMM-JSA, 2017 WL 3085282,
at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2017).
150. In December 2017, after the Ninth Circuit again ruled in favor of Robins’s standing,
Spokeo filed a second petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 17-806, 2018 WL 3085282 (Jan. 22, 2018). The
petitioners wrote that “hundreds of lower courts [had] adopted conflicting interpretations” of
the Court’s standard expressed in Spokeo and asked the Court to address “widespread

2018]

THE HUNT FOR PRIVACY HARMS

2457

II. COURTS SEARCH FOR PRIVACY HARMS AFTER SPOKEO
While the case was only decided in 2016, one result of Spokeo now seems
assured: it introduced fresh layers of confusion in an area of the law—
privacy claims—that was already rife with uncertainty.151 A string of cases
decided in both the circuit courts of appeals and the federal district courts
since Spokeo have addressed standing challenges that arose after plaintiffs
brought claims pursuant to a statute that implicated a privacy concern.152
Part II details significant cases that have been decided since Spokeo and
examines the way in which they follow the Supreme Court’s suggestions to
test the concreteness of intangible injuries. Part II.A looks at the privacy
interests courts have and have not recognized as legitimate for standing
purposes. Part II.B then explores some of the subtleties that can arise in
courts’ comparisons to analogous harms. Finally, Part II.C uses the Eighth
Circuit’s decisions in Braitberg v. Charter Communications, Inc.153 and
Heglund v. Aitkin County154 to investigate the different ways courts may
frame seemingly similar injuries to different results in the standing analysis.
A. What Privacy Interests Are Courts Protecting?
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court held that Robins could not prevail on the
basis of a “bare procedural violation.”155 The Court went on to say that “not
all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of harm” and gave
the example of an inaccurate zip code to illustrate a harmless privacy
violation.156 The Court concluded that “[i]t is difficult to imagine how the
dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any
concrete harm.”157
The Supreme Court stated that “both history and the judgment of Congress
play important roles” and instructed lower courts to look to both of these

confusion” about the status of intangible harms. Id. at i, 14. The Supreme Court denied the
petition on January 22, 2018. Spokeo, 2018 WL 3085282.
151. See William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197,
216; Lauren E. Willis, Spokeo Misspeaks, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 103); Megan Dowty, Note, Life Is Short. Go to Court: Establishing Article III
Standing in Data Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 696 (2017).
152. One review of cases that cited to Spokeo in holding on standing found that the majority
of the cases clumped around the FCRA, the TCPA, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA). Tyler Kasperek Somes, Assessing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: The Future of Statutory
Damage Class Actions in the Consumer Protection Arena, 20 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 122,
125 (2017).
153. 836 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016).
154. 871 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2017).
155. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016).
156. Id.
157. Id. This “zip code” example has been cited repeatedly by lower courts in the course
of denying standing. See, e.g., Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930; Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc.,
830 F.3d 511, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (stating that “the Supreme Court advised . . . [that]
disclosure of an incorrect zip code is not a concrete Article III injury”); Cruper-Weinmann v.
Paris Baguette Am., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 570, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). One scholar contests the
example’s premise and argues that an inaccurate zip code can indeed be the source of
substantial harms in a data-driven world. See Wu, supra note 16, at 459.
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sources of guidance when faced with alleged intangible injuries.158
Harkening back to the case-or-controversy requirement, the Court noted, “[I]t
is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis
for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”159 It continued, “Congress is
well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III
requirements” and so “its judgment is also instructive and important.”160
Part II.A.1 lays out cases where the courts have denied standing and have
held that the plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient injury. Part II.A.2 then
presents cases where courts have found standing, at least in part, by
analogizing the plaintiff’s alleged injury to one that has been historically
recognized by the courts, usually in the common law, and frequently to one
of the privacy torts.
1. Requiring More Than a Statutory Violation
Lower courts have followed Spokeo’s instructions in cases in which they
have found that the plaintiffs had not suffered any concrete harm, despite the
alleged violation of a statute as to that individual plaintiff. In one such case,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that plaintiffs had
not adequately established standing for alleged violations of Washington
D.C.’s Use of Consumer Identification Information Act and its Consumer
Protection Procedures Act.161 The two plaintiffs had made purchases at local
clothing stores and, while at the register, were each asked for their zip codes,
a request that they alleged violated statutory protections against requiring
address information to complete their transactions.162 The court denied
standing and noted that neither of the plaintiffs alleged any harm, such as
invasion of privacy or emotional injury, beyond the “naked assertion that a
zip code was requested and recorded.”163
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Meyers v. Nicolet
Restaurant of De Pere, LLC,164 where the court heard allegations under the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA).165 The plaintiff,
Meyers, received a receipt after dining at the defendant-restaurant that did
not have the credit card expiration date properly truncated as required by
law.166 The Seventh Circuit reviewed the claims in light of the Court’s
holding in Spokeo, stated that the inclusion of the full expiration led to no
“appreciable risk of harm,” and concluded that Meyers’s alleged injuries
were insufficient to confer standing.167 The Seventh Circuit did not say that

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
Id.
Id.
Hancock, 830 F.3d at 512.
Id.
Id. at 513–14.
843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id. at 727.
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such a violation of FACTA could never satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
but stated that the plaintiff’s allegations were “completely divorced from any
potential real-world harm.”168
The Second Circuit similarly held that standing did not exist in a pair of
FACTA cases, Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette America, Inc.169 and
Katz v. Donna Karan Co.170 In Paris Baguette, the plaintiff brought suit after
she received a receipt that displayed her credit card’s full expiration date;171
in Katz, decided three months after Paris Baguette, the plaintiff alleged that
he received a receipt that improperly displayed the first six digits of his credit
card number.172 In Paris Baguette, the Second Circuit said that it was joining
the Seventh Circuit’s result in Meyers and held that printing “an expiration
date on an otherwise properly redacted receipt” does not satisfy the injuryin-fact requirement.173 In Katz, the court held that the court below had not
erred in finding that the alleged FACTA violation did “not increase the risk
of real harm” and so was not sufficient to establish standing.174
Outside the FACTA context, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have arrived
at similar results in two cases that implicated claims under the Cable
Communications Policy Act (CCPA), which provides that a “cable operator
shall destroy personally identifiable information if the information is no
longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected and there are no
pending requests or orders for access [by the subscriber] or pursuant to a court
order.”175 In the Eighth Circuit case, plaintiff and class representative
Braitberg alleged that defendant Charter Communications’s failure to destroy
customers’ personally identifiable information after they had canceled their
subscriptions was a “direct invasion of [customers’] federally protected
privacy rights.”176 Plaintiffs contended that this violation of a statutory right
alone was enough to qualify as an injury in fact, but the Eighth Circuit found
that argument unconvincing and instead stated that Spokeo had “superseded”
two earlier circuit decisions that seemed to support Braitberg’s position.177
The court denied standing on the ground that Braitberg had “identifie[d] no
material risk of harm” from Charter Communications’s retention of the data
and further commented that the common law recognized no harm emerging
from the company retaining information it had obtained lawfully.178
The Seventh Circuit borrowed from Braitberg and its own precedent in
Meyers in denying standing for a putative class action that also alleged CCPA
violations in Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.179 Despite denying
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 729.
861 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017).
872 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2017).
Paris Baguette, 861 F.3d at 78.
Katz, 872 F.3d at 116.
Paris Baguette, 861 F.3d at 82.
Katz, 872 F.3d at 120.
47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (2012).
Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 929–30.
Id. at 930.
846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017).
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standing, the court, as in Braitberg, went out of its way to say that
“[v]iolations of rights of privacy are actionable,” even if the plaintiff in this
particular case could go no further.180 The plaintiff in Gubala had not alleged
that Time Warner had “ever given away or leaked or lost any of his personal
information or intends to give it away or is at risk of having the information
stolen from it.”181 Nor did Gubala say that he “fear[ed] that Time Warner
w[ould] give away the information and it w[ould] be used to harm him.”182
Presumably, if the plaintiff had asserted any or some combination of these
privacy interests, the court might at least have been more willing to let him
proceed. But, the court said, “he hasn’t said any of that.”183
2. Protection for Claims with Common Law Analogues
In cases where courts have been able to identify a privacy interest, or an
intersection of privacy interests, that have historically been recognized by the
courts, the courts have found sufficient injury for standing purposes.
a. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act Cases
The Eighth Circuit’s denial of an invasion of a privacy interest in Braitberg
sufficient to confer standing can be contrasted with its holdings in Shambour
v. Carver County184 and Heglund v. Aitkin County,185 cases decided nearly
three weeks apart and in which standing was found for plaintiffs who alleged
violations of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA).186 The DPPA
“restricts the use and distribution of personal information contained in motorvehicle records.”187
In Heglund, the husband-and-wife-plaintiffs alleged that their information
in Minnesota’s driver’s license database had been improperly accessed by
police officers.188 The couple requested an audit of access to their
information because they feared harassment from Jennifer Heglund’s exhusband, who was a Minnesota state trooper.189 The audit revealed that her
information had been accessed 446 times over a ten-year period and that her
current husband’s records had been accessed thirty-four times between 2006
and 2013.190 The defendants, challenging the plaintiffs’ standing, argued that
Jennifer Heglund’s “professed anxiety from knowing that [an officer]
improperly accessed her personal information is not sufficiently concrete to

180. Id. at 912.
181. Id. at 910.
182. Id. at 913.
183. Id.
184. No. 16-1425, 2017 WL 4231114 (8th Cir. Sept. 25, 2017).
185. 871 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2017).
186. Shambour, 2017 WL 4231114, at *3; Heglund, 871 F.3d at 577; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721 (2012).
187. Shambour, 2017 WL 4231114, at *1.
188. Heglund, 871 F.3d at 575.
189. Id. at 575–76.
190. Id. at 576.
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constitute an injury in fact.”191 The court disagreed. It explicitly
distinguished Braitberg and found that “[a]n individual’s control of
information concerning her person—the privacy interest the Heglunds claim
here—was a cognizable interest at common law.”192 The Heglund court
explained this different outcome by drawing a line between the privacy
interest it identified as legitimate here, and “the lack of comparable tradition
of suits for retaining information lawfully obtained” that seemed to form the
basis for the plaintiff’s claim in Braitberg.193
In Shambour, the second of these two Eighth Circuit DPPA cases, the
plaintiff alleged that her driver’s records had been accessed fifty-nine times
over an eight-year period.194 A former law enforcement officer, Shambour
alleged that “her appearance [had] ‘changed noticeably’ since her time as an
officer” and “hypothesized that individuals viewed her record out of romantic
attraction or curiosity about the changes in her appearance.”195 Finding that
the plaintiff’s claims could not be distinguished from those in Heglund, the
court held that she had standing for her DPPA claims.196
b. Fair Credit Reporting Act Cases
Two cases examining standing for FCRA claims serve to further
demonstrate the privacy interests courts have identified and explain that the
invasion of these interests constitutes an injury under a Spokeo analysis.
The FCRA cases present two apparently dissimilar fact patterns—the first
involves allegedly stolen laptops, and the second concerns Spokeo on remand
from the Supreme Court. In In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data
Breach Litigation,197 the Third Circuit weighed standing for plaintiffs who
alleged, after the theft of two laptops holding sensitive personal information,
that defendant Horizon had provided inadequate protection for their personal
information.198 There, the court found that Congress had, through the FCRA,
“create[d] a remedy for the unauthorized transfer of personal information.”199
The court stated that, “with privacy torts, improper dissemination of
information” can rise to the level of a cognizable injury.200 Although
Horizon’s actions would not in themselves necessarily generate a cause of
action under common law,201 the court noted that Congress had, in FCRA,
“established that the unauthorized dissemination of personal information by
a credit reporting agency causes an injury in and of itself.”202
191. Id. at 577.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 578.
194. Shambour, 2017 WL 4231114, at *1.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *2.
197. 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017).
198. Id. at 629.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 638–39.
201. “No common law tort proscribes the release of truthful information that is not harmful
to one’s reputation or otherwise offensive.” Id. at 639.
202. Id.
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Analyzing Robins’s claims on remand (and citing In re Horizon), the Ninth
Circuit similarly emphasized that the pairing between a harm defined by
Congress in statute and one long recognized in the courts does not have to be
an exact match.203 “Even if there are differences between FCRA’s cause of
action and those recognized at common law, the relevant point is that
Congress has chosen to protect against a harm that is at least closely similar
in kind to others that have traditionally served as the basis for lawsuit.”204 In
Robins’s case, the Ninth Circuit said that “[c]ourts have long entertained
causes of action to vindicate intangible harms caused by certain untruthful
disclosures about individuals”205 and that in FCRA Congress had applied that
principle to a perceived risk of harm206 that could arise in the context of credit
reporting.207
c. Video Privacy Protection Act Cases
Finally, the Third and Eleventh Circuits have discerned a close relationship
between traditional causes of action and VPPA claims in In re Nickelodeon
Consumer Privacy Litigation208 and Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc.209
The Third Circuit in In re Nickelodeon—a consolidated class action that
alleged that Google and Viacom unlawfully collected data from the plaintiffs,
children under age thirteen, including the videos they watched and websites
they visited210—held that Spokeo did nothing to deny the plaintiffs standing
and that the alleged harm included a “de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful
disclosure of legally protected information.”211 The court did not pair the
alleged harm with a specific common law analogue but instead seemingly
blended the congressional and historical inquiries. It stated, “Congress has
long provided plaintiffs with the right to seek redress for unauthorized
disclosures of information that, in Congress’s judgment, ought to remain
private.”212
The Eleventh Circuit took greater pains to point out the nearness of the
VPPA claims alleged to a common law harm in Perry.213 The plaintiff in
this case brought suit under the VPPA alleging that, after he downloaded the
CNN app to his phone in 2013, the app collected information on his viewing
activity without his knowledge and unlawfully disclosed his personally
identifiable information.214 The Eleventh Circuit analogized to the elements
203. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. For example, in introducing the FCRA, lawmakers recounted the story of a man who
was never able to obtain credit even after he had been exonerated of a crime. 115 CONG. REC.
2411–12 (1969).
207. Robins, 867 F.3d at 1115.
208. 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016).
209. 854 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017).
210. In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 267.
211. Id. at 274.
212. Id.
213. Perry, 854 F.3d at 1340–41.
214. Id. at 1338–39.
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of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion and further noted that “Supreme Court
precedent has recognized in the privacy context that an individual has an
interest in preventing disclosure of personal information.”215 The court held
that Perry had “satisfied the concreteness requirement of Article III standing,
[by] alleg[ing] a violation of the VPPA for a wrongful disclosure.”216
B. The Problems with Common Law Analogues
Because of the Supreme Court’s instruction in Spokeo that lower courts
should consider both the “judgment of Congress” and any “close
relationship” to a harm historically recognized in the law,217 courts have
scrutinized how closely an alleged harm resembles one recognized at
common law or otherwise in the English and American legal traditions. One
potential problem with this closeness analysis is that it leaves to individual
judges the framing of the alleged harm and the question of whether it has the
“feel”218 of a traditionally recognized harm. And so, in the cases since
Spokeo, courts can be seen engaging in this closeness inquiry with varying
degrees of precision, sometimes naming specific privacy torts, other common
law causes of action like libel,219 or “a right of individual privacy.”220 These
courts are not interpreting Spokeo to require them to draw a precise line from

215. Id. at 1341.
216. Id.
217. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
218. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Judicial
power could come into play only in matters that . . . arose in ways that to the expert feel of
lawyers constituted ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’”).
219. Hatch v. Demayo, No. 1:16CV925, 2017 WL 4357447, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 29,
2017) (“Specifically, Plaintiffs’ allegation bears a close relationship to the interest protected
by the invasion of privacy torts, namely, leading a secluded and private life.”); Garey v. Farrin,
No. 1:16CV542, 2017 WL 4357445, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2017) (“Plaintiffs’ alleged
harms are closely related to the invasion of privacy, which has long provided a basis for
recovery at common law.”); Phillips v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-00088, 2017 WL
3911018, at *1 (W.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2017) (stating that the plaintiff’s “alleged injury is
analogous to common law causes of action (like defamation and libel)”); In re Vizio, Inc.,
Consumer Privacy Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“Plaintiffs’ VPPA
claims are even more deeply rooted in the common law.”); Gambles v. Sterling Infosystems,
Inc., 234 F. Supp. 3d 510, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“These echo the sorts of allegations on which
tort claims were permitted to proceed at common law . . . .”); Whitaker v. Appriss, Inc., 229
F. Supp. 3d 809, 812 (N.D. Ind. 2017) (“Rights protected in statutes like the [Drivers Privacy
Protection Act] are natural outgrowths of the privacy-based torts of the common law.”);
Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-CV-04062-LHK, 2016 WL 5339806, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
23, 2016) (“[V]iolations of the Wiretap Act and [Children’s Internet Protection Act] are
similar to common law invasion of privacy in both their substantive prohibitions and their
purpose.”); Witt v. Corelogic Saferent, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-386, 2016 WL 4424955, at *12
(E.D. Va. Aug. 18, 2016) (“The common law has long recognized a right to personal
privacy . . . .”); Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 645 (N.D. W. Va. 2016)
(“The invasion of privacy claim that is most analogous here is intrusion upon seclusion.”);
Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, 193 F. Supp. 3d 623, 636 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“[I]t has long been the
case that an unauthorized dissemination of one’s personal information . . . constitutes a
concrete injury . . . .”).
220. Ruk v. Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:16-CV-3444-LMM-JSA, 2017 WL 3085282,
at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2017) (“[O]ur common law traditionally recognizes a right of
individual privacy, which is legally protected by the courts in certain circumstances.”).
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a privacy harm Congress has identified to one that has a long history in the
courts. One district court has stated that defendants seeking to challenge
plaintiffs’ standing should not misinterpret Spokeo as requiring that the
privacy interest protected by statute be precisely the same as one protected
by a common law privacy harm for if that was necessary, there would be little
use for the statute.221
C. Can Braitberg and Heglund Be Reconciled?
A comparison of Braitberg and Heglund sheds light on some of the
concerns courts bring to bear when applying Spokeo to an alleged privacy
injury. Perhaps most significantly, these two cases—in which different
statutes were at issue—also demonstrate how the way in which the parties
and court frame the potential common law analogue can influence the
outcome of the standing analysis.
Both the DPPA and the CCPA contain provisions aimed at ensuring that
the information in question is used only for the purpose for which it was
collected, absent consent for a new use.222 In Braitberg, the CCPA imposed
what the plaintiff alleged was “a duty to destroy personally identifiable
information” and, the plaintiff alleged, the defendant violated this duty “by
retaining certain information longer than the company should have kept
it.”223 The alleged injury in Heglund was that the repeated improper access
of the plaintiffs’ records had “invad[ed] Jennifer’s privacy.”224 In both cases,
the plaintiffs took action before filing suit to ascertain whether there had been
some allegedly unlawful treatment of their information—that it had been
improperly retained or wrongfully accessed.225
But the circuit’s opinions diverged when they sought a common law
analogue. The Braitberg court determined that “retention of information
lawfully obtained . . . without further disclosure” has not traditionally been
recognized in American courts, while the Heglund court stated that “[a]n
individual’s control of information concerning her person . . . was a
cognizable interest at common law.”226
There are other concerns that have traditionally formed important
subcurrents in privacy discourse that, if not explicitly relied upon in the
Heglund court’s rationale, nevertheless merit mention in the opinion,
including that the alleged wrongful access implicated law enforcement
personnel and that the plaintiff “professed anxiety” about the suspected
access.227 While the court does not say that these facts in the case led to its
identification of a privacy harm and concrete injury, both the sense of an

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Whitaker, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 813.
Solove, supra note 62, at 520–21.
Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016).
Heglund v. Aitkin County, 871 F.3d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 2017).
Heglund, 871 F.3d at 576; Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 927.
Heglund, 871 F.3d at 577; Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930.
Heglund, 871 F.3d at 576–77.
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emotional harm228 and the potential abuse of government authority to violate
a protected privacy interest229 have historically been important perimeter
markers for privacy harms.
III. TIME TO RETHINK THE NATURE OF PRIVACY INJURIES
This Part suggests that Spokeo’s instruction that courts should look to
whether an alleged intangible injury bears close comparison to a traditionally
recognized harm has opened an unanticipated opportunity to reinvigorate
discussion in the federal judiciary about the nature of privacy harms.230 The
efficacy of agency and administrative enforcement of privacy statutes has
been questioned,231 and the courts, adjudicating suits brought by private
individuals, may prove to be an important force in regulating privacy
infringements caused by information technology.232 If courts do not embrace
this role and instead do more to limit private causes of action in federal
privacy statutes through the vehicle of standing, they will further defang the
few protections individuals have in the data economy.233 As matters now
stand, companies with vast stores of data often face little in the way of
substantive repercussions when those data are breached.234 Without the
potential for private enforcement, privacy statutes run the risk of becoming
congressional dead letters, “mere suggestions.”235 This Part proposes one
way courts can prevent that outcome, while staying safely within the
framework of Spokeo.
Part III.A argues—drawing from a substantial body of scholarship
developed by Daniel Solove, Ryan Calo, Danielle Citron, Neil Richards, and
others—that Prosser’s four privacy torts are, on their own, inadequate to
228. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 54, at 213; see also M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of
Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1145 (2011).
229. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967).
230. This Note takes no position on whether a plaintiff should have to show more than a
statutory violation; that is, it does not seek to answer the question of “statutory standing.” This
Note rather proceeds on the observable fact that lower courts are searching for analogues for
alleged privacy injuries and offers suggestions for courts pursuing that inquiry.
231. Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 26–31
(2008); Austin H. Krist, Note, Large-Scale Enforcement of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and
the Role of State Attorneys General, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2311, 2324 (2015).
232. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court to Settle Major Cellphone Privacy
Case, REUTERS (June 5, 2017, 9:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courtmobilephone/u-s-supreme-court-to-settle-major-cellphone-privacy-case-idUSKBN18W1RY
[https://perma.cc/T88D-UFAG]; Jill Priluck, How Courts Avoid Ruling on Issues of Privacy,
SLATE (Apr. 11, 2017, 5:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/
2017/04/how_courts_avoid_ruling_on_issues_of_technology_and_privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/R5BF-EYYD].
233. One scholar has already observed that “the trend in federal privacy statutes has been
to undercut the interests of individuals in protecting privacy rights.” De Armond, supra note
231, at 45.
234. See Robert Hackett, How Much Do Data Breaches Cost Big Companies?: Shockingly
Little, FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/27/how-much-do-data-breachesactually-cost-big-companies-shockingly-little/ [https://perma.cc/4TMR-S437].
235. De Armond, supra note 231, at 35.
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provide legal redress for harms generated by the data economy. Part III.B
then encourages courts to employ a nexus approach to assess the concreteness
of privacy harms, an approach that satisfies Spokeo while at the same time
unchaining courts from the overworked privacy torts. Finally, Part III.C
emphasizes the extent to which privacy harms arising from new technology
have been topics of considerable concern both to the public and the Supreme
Court in recent years.
A. Privacy Torts Are Ill Matched to New Harms
Scholars have remarked that the privacy torts that sprang from Warren and
Brandeis’s collaboration, and that were systematized by Prosser, are poorly
suited to the challenges presented by changing forms of technology.236 One
scholar has noted how the torts are often defined partly by reference to
protected spaces237—for example, intrusion upon seclusion—but this
approach runs up against its limits where technology has blurred traditional
legal boundaries. Professor Citron has urged courts to “take cues from
privacy tort law’s intellectual history to ensure its continued vitality.”238 She
urges courts to do this by revisiting the emphasis Warren and Brandeis put
on the right of privacy as protecting an individual’s “inviolate
personality.”239 Professor Sarah Ludington has proposed a novel tort for the
misuse of personal information that takes guidance from both the existing
privacy torts and privacy legislation.240 The judicial reluctance to continue
the development of the privacy torts over the past century241 has only served
to exacerbate the need for new consideration of what privacy harms the law
should recognize.
Part III.A.1 argues that, while the privacy torts may be useful to courts
looking to identify sufficiently concrete privacy injuries for standing
purposes, Spokeo does not limit their search to the four privacy torts. Part
III.A.2 lays out some more recent conceptualizations of privacy injury
proposed by scholars.
1. Spokeo Does Not Bind Courts to Privacy Torts
The Supreme Court’s instruction in Spokeo to consider whether an alleged
intangible harm bears a relation to one traditionally recognized by the courts
does not require the courts to hew so closely to the four traditional privacy

236. Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy from History, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 973, 973 (2012)
(noting that “tort privacy is especially inadequate to address the needs of the twenty-first
century”); Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal
Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 145 (2006); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s
Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 155 (2007).
237. Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 17–18 (2007).
238. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1852
(2010).
239. Id.
240. Ludington, supra note 236, at 146.
241. See supra Part I.C.
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torts when considering the concreteness of an injury asserted under a statute
implicating a privacy interest. In other words, that the plaintiff asserts a harm
to a privacy interest does not mean the harm must itself bear a close
relationship to a traditional privacy tort. Both the Ninth and Third Circuits
have emphasized that Spokeo does not require an exact match.242 One district
court, in a decision cited by several others,243 has further emphasized that
Spokeo’s concreteness analysis does not require that the harm with which a
closeness is identified be “of any particular jurisdiction” and further stated
that the analogous harm does not need to be one that, if alleged
independently, would give rise to a viable tort claim.244
This degree of discretion courts can employ in searching out analogues for
alleged privacy harms seems particularly appropriate, as determinations
concerning what interests deserve privacy protection are always normative
and culturally conditioned.245 Privacy is contextual.246 Courts should look
beyond the privacy torts to other privacy-related interests historically
protected by the courts to allow plaintiffs to pass the standing bar drawn by
Spokeo, both out of deference to separation-of-powers principles—which
undergird standing as a doctrine247—and to give vitality to privacy claims.
This would serve separation-of-powers principles because it would help
the courts give meaningful effect to the statutes Congress has enacted. The
decision by Congress to include a private right of action when a privacy
concern is at stake represents a purposeful and reasoned decision by the
legislature. Neither the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) nor the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), both of which
implicate privacy concerns, contains an explicit private right of action.248
Courts, including the Supreme Court, reviewing the legislative histories of
statutes such as the FCRA,249 the VPPA,250 the TCPA,251 and the DPPA252
have found that Congress, as the nation’s deliberative and legislative body,
was responding to specific privacy concerns and intended to regulate certain
privacy-infringing behavior.
Furthermore, undue adherence to Prosser’s privacy torts leads to an
incomplete picture of the range of privacy harms that have historically been
242. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017); Susinno v. Work Out
World, Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 2017).
243. See Engebretson v. Aitkin County, No. 14-1435 ADM/FLN, 2016 WL 5400363, at *4
(D. Minn. Sept. 26, 2016); Krekelberg v. Anoka County, No. 13-3562 (DWF/TNL), 2016 WL
4443156, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 2016).
244. Potocnik v. Carlson, No. 13-CV-2093 (PJS/HB), 2016 WL 3919950, at *3 (D. Minn.
July 15, 2016).
245. Solove, supra note 62, at 484.
246. See Abril, supra note 237, at 2.
247. See supra Part I.A.
248. Menton v. Experian Corp., No. 02 Civ. 4687(NRB), 2003 WL 21692820, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003); Joshua D.W. Collins, Note, Toothless HIPAA: Searching for a
Private Right of Action to Remedy Privacy Rule Violations, 60 VAND. L. REV. 199, 201 (2007).
249. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007).
250. See Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 2015).
251. See L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 2017).
252. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143–44 (2000).
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recognized by the law. Eavesdropping was a crime at common law.253
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and “the constitutional right to information
privacy [and] evidentiary privileges”254 all fall under the umbrella of privacy
law. The protection of privacy afforded by anonymous speech has long been
an important part of American public life and has been described by the Court
as “a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”255 Holding the courts to the
four privacy torts in their search for analogues misrepresents the privacy
concerns sown broadly across the landscape of American law.
2. Novel Conceptions of Privacy Injury Have Been Proposed
While courts have been slow since Prosser to delineate new privacy
wrongs, scholars have engaged in robust discussion of what constitutes an
injury to privacy and what forms of privacy harm should be legally
cognizable. Instead of being amorphous and merely motivated by an “ick”
factor, one professor has described privacy harms as “unique injur[ies] with
specific boundaries and characteristics.”256 Professor Citron has argued that
courts can look to the seventy years preceding Prosser’s work as a way to
revitalize their privacy inquiries.257 Richards has argued for rights of
“intellectual privacy” that are founded on the First Amendment and that
protect “our reading, our communications, and our expressive dealings with
others.”258 Another commentator has suggested, drawing on fiduciary law,
that courts could impose a duty to secure the information they obtain on “data
confidants.”259 Writing together, Solove and Citron have noted that, in the
context of harms resulting from data breaches, courts are presented with
opportunities to read precedents “flexibly and creatively”—but seldom seize
that chance.260
The intellectual groundwork laid by these scholars stands ready to assist
courts prepared to investigate more deeply new forms of privacy harm that
arise from the widespread collection and retention of data.
B. A Nexus of Privacy Interests Is Sufficient
Few of the plaintiffs in the cases discussed in this Note appear to have
asserted anything so broad as the “right to be let alone”261 that famously
motivated the Warren-Brandeis conception of privacy and that spurred the
development of privacy law in America.262 Rather, plaintiffs suing under
253. Solove, supra note 62, at 492.
254. Id. at 478.
255. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); see also Joel R.
Reidenberg, The Transparent Citizen, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 437, 439 (2015).
256. Calo, supra note 228, at 1131.
257. Citron, supra note 238, at 1832–34.
258. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408 (2008).
259. Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law
Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 628 (2018).
260. Solove & Citron, supra note 103, at 786.
261. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 54, at 193.
262. Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of
the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 623–25 (2002).
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privacy statutes seem to act on the basis of a more narrow principle: that
when society, through Congress, has circumscribed certain interactions as
subject to privacy protections, individuals should be able to sue for redress
when they personally suffer infringements of those interests. This Part
proposes a way that federal courts, working within the framework laid out by
Spokeo, can conceptualize those alleged injuries in the context of standing.
In order to grant plaintiffs the benefit of the few existing privacy
protections in statute, courts employing Spokeo’s standing analysis for the
concreteness of intangible harms should apply a nexus approach that looks
beyond the privacy torts in assessing whether plaintiffs have adequately
established injury in fact. They should look for significant overlapping
privacy concerns that have historically been recognized by the courts.
Instead of seeking a perfect tort analogue to an alleged privacy injury and
dismissing for lack of standing if no perfect analogue exists, lower courts
should find that such a nexus of implicated privacy interests is sufficient to
give concreteness to the alleged injury.
The cases in Part II illustrate how, to some extent, this is already what
courts are doing when they find privacy harms.263 But because of the
potential for confusion and uncertainty that surrounds privacy, the
insufficiency of the privacy torts, and the potential for privacy-adverse judges
to frame a privacy interest so as to not recognize a common law analogue,264
the courts should shift to an approach that finds that a nexus of privacy
interests is sufficient. Such a nexus may be formed by the intersection of the
varied privacy-related interests long recognized by the law, including the
involvement of law enforcement in the alleged injury, emotional distress, or
other conjunctions of privacy-implicated concerns that in and of themselves
would not give rise to a cause of action.
This approach would help courts recognize privacy harms as Warren and
Brandeis, and the opinions they drew on, found such harms—unnamed but
nevertheless present.265 An approach that recognizes a nexus of privacy
concerns as sufficient to establish concreteness for purposes of injury in fact
would also go further toward respecting the separation-of-powers principles
that serve as the constitutional underpinnings for the standing doctrine.266 To
restrict Congress to the identification only of harms that look like older harms
would be an improper judicial interference with the legislative power vested
in Article I of the Constitution, quite apart from the practical difficulties sure
to result from strictly restraining federal courts to the harms that would have
been familiar to their judicial ancestors in “the courts at Westminster.”267
This nexus approach, which finds a new privacy interest where several
traditional privacy concerns overlap, especially when the area within that
nexus has been elevated by a statute, best respects the interests both of
263. Supra Part II.
264. Supra Part I.C.
265. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. (a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see
also supra Part I.B.1.
266. Supra note 46 and accompanying text.
267. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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privacy law and of the constitutional, separation-of-powers justifications for
standing. It allows courts to identify injuries similar to those with which their
competency is long settled, while simultaneously not hampering Congress’s
power to respond to new forms of harm.
C. Supreme Court and Public Are Both Concerned with Privacy
Privacy harms are a growing area of legal concern that courts should not
ignore. As the Ninth Circuit recently observed, “[t]he modern information
age has shined a spotlight on information privacy.”268 Outside of the legal
arena, Pierre Omidyar, a prominent technology billionaire who founded
eBay, wrote in the Washington Post that he fears that, “[f]or all the ways this
technology brings us together, the monetization and manipulation of
information is swiftly tearing us apart.”269 The United States saw 1091 data
breaches in 2016, a 40 percent increase over the previous year.270
The Supreme Court has recognized the manner in which changes in
technology can result in new forms of harm to privacy interests.271 In 2011,
in the course of striking down a Vermont law that restricted the sale of
prescriber data to pharmaceutical marketers, the Court in Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc.272 said that the “capacity of technology to find and publish
personal information . . . presents serious and unresolved issues with respect
to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.”273 Little has been
done since to address that threat to privacy.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s holding in Spokeo added new difficulty to the
already considerable challenges privacy plaintiffs face. As businesses built
on the commodification of personal information expand, the privacy torts,
long starved for judicial attention, have proven ill equipped to the regulation
of this widespread economic activity, with its attendant potential for harms.
Should the federal courts, through the vehicle of standing, remove themselves
from the adjudication of novel privacy harms, even when redress for such
harms has been provided for by Congress, there will be little incentive for
companies to avoid such harms, and private individuals will be left without
a remedy.
The approach proposed by this Note accords with the Court’s instructions
in Spokeo for testing the concreteness of intangible harms and would allow
268. Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 495 (9th Cir. 2017).
269. Pierre Omidyar, Opinion, Pierre Omidyar: 6 Ways Social Media Has Become a
Direct
Threat
to
Democracy,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
9,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2017/10/09/pierre-omidyar-6ways-social-media-has-become-a-direct-threat-to-democracy/?utm_term=.7252f92a6207
[https://perma.cc/7U6R-BKT6].
270. Data Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Report from Identity Theft
Resource Center and CyberScout, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR. (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches.html [https://perma.cc/CS2Y-ZPGT].
271. Supra Part I.B.1.
272. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
273. Id. at 2672.
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plaintiffs to pursue the remedies Congress has afforded them in privacy
statutes. This approach properly respects the separation-of-powers rationale
that the Supreme Court has said rests at the core of standing, and it helps
ensure that courts retain their important role as protectors of private
individuals’ rights in a shifting economic landscape by giving force and
meaning to the privacy protections Congress has enacted.

